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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
by
John L. FitzGerald*

p

ROFESSOR Frank E. Cooper's recent two-volume work, State Administrative Law, gave the legal profession its first comprehensive survey of
administrative law as it has developed in the states.' His pioneering furnishes a useful outline into which future state-wide studies may be fitted
thereby helping to make this indifferently-indexed area of the law the subject of practical discovery. This Article will follow Cooper's outline so far
as possible. :
I.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

A. Separation Of Powers: Constitutional Tests
The Texas Constitution, article II, section 1,' reads:
"The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided
into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate
body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which
are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no
person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall
exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the
instances herein expressly permitted." 3
Because of this separation of powers doctrine, the supreme court, although recognizing exceptions in certain areas, either has declared statutes
requiring complete de novo review of agency findings unconstitutional
or construed them as requiring application of the substantial evidence rule_
by the reviewing court.' This attitude was modified irr Southern Canal Co.
* B.A., LL.B., University of Washington; LL.M., Harvard University; S-.D., Georgetown Uni--versity. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author acknowledges the assistance
of Michael Kellough.
has established a pattern for this Texas Survey
'COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1965)
in his survey of Michigan administrative law, Cooper, Administrative Law, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 19
(1964). Since Michigan has an Administrative Procedure Act, MICHIGAN CoMp. LAWS- S 24.101
(Supp. 1961), MICH. STAT. ANN. 66 §§ 3.560(21.1), and Texas does not, this survey must depart
from Professor Cooper's format to some extent. Compare TEX. RErv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-12
(1962), which provides a comprehensive state procedural act but is applicable only to rules of
practice, procedure and organization.
ITEX. CoNsT. art. 2, § 1.
3 ibid.
4 Roughly defined, the Texas substantial evidence rule is that administrative findings of fact
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, i.e., more than a mere scintilla of evidence,
with rational probative force. This rule is applied by the trial court sitting de novo. For an excellent basic article on this subject see Larson, The Substantial Evidence Rule: Texas Version, 5
Sw. L.J. 152 (1951). The recognized exceptions are review of public utility rate orders in which
"constitutional" or "jurisdictional" fact issues were raised, industrial accident awards, and certain
orders of the Board of Insurance Commissioners.
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v. State Bd. of Water Eng'rs' and Key W. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins.'
to allow the legislature more latitude in providing for complete de novo
review. As re-emphasized by Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner' the
legislature may provide for complete de novo review if (1) it does this by
clear and specific statutory provision so that it is difficult for the court to
construe the statute as merely meaning a substantial evidence type of judicial scrutiny,' (2) if the administrative proceeding is adjudicatory in nature,' and (3) if the statutory standards furnished the agency are neither
of a legislative nor administrative policy nature."0 Some cases also lay stress
on the presence or abscence in the statute of a provision automatically vacating the administrative order upon appeal," but this factor should be considered an interpretative aid rather than a sine qua non of complete de novo
review." The past year has not seen the development of especially significant judicial doctrine in regard to de novo review, though there have been
some cases of interest.
De novo judicial review provisions of the Texas Liquor Control Act"
were declared void in a court of civil appeals decision" as a violation of the
separation of powers provision of the Texas Constitution. t" The court reviewing cancellation, after hearing, of a liquor permit by the Texas Liquor
Control Board, found the judicial review provisions specific in their requirement that a de novo review be accorded. Considered to be controlling
5159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619 (1958)
(invalidating a judicial review provision of a state
which required review de novo).
s163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d 839 (1961)
(upholding a de novo judicial review statutory provision).
7 369 .S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963) (invalidating a de novo judicial review statutory provision).
8
Id. at 431.
9
1d. at 432.
10 Ibid.
"Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Longwill, 392 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismissedl.
" A niche-like application of de novo guides may lead to overly technical results. In Mann v.
Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 403 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted, a
doctor's license was revoked by the Board after administrative hearing. He appealed and five years
later (1963) the case came on for trial. The appellant did not appear, and the district court dismissed the cause, the court's order containing the following words, "[T]he same is hereby dismissed
for want of prosecution at plaintiff's cost." Ten months later the doctor tendered his license renewal fee and the Board accepted it, but refused to accept subsequent renewal fees. The doctor
petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The district court refused the writ. The court of civil appeals
reversed and rendered on the grounds that (1) de novo judicial review applied to this appeal and
therefore the Board's order was automatically vacated upon the taking of the appeal, notwithstanding the fact that the statute provided that the Board's order was not to be suspended except
upon application to the court; and (2) the district court's dismissal of the appeal for "want of
prosecution" in effect brought the revocation to an end since it was the Board's duty to "prosecute"
the action and it had failed to oppose the order of dismissal. The court made no special point of
the acceptance of a renewal fee after dismissal by the licensee of his appeal.
13Trx, PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-15(e), §§ 7a.7, 10 (1952), and art. 666-12 (Supp. 1966).
'4 Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Longwill, 392 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismissed, 19 Sw. L.J. 662.
" Tr.x. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
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precedent was Scott v. Texas State Bd.- of Medical Exam iners' which held
that the Board's action of revoking a doctor's license was subject to complete de novo review because the proceeding was adjudicatory in nature and
because it did not, involve determinatiQn .of legislative policy. The court
held that it would not be permissible to give such a complete review to the
administrative action of cancelling a liquor permit because it was based on
legislative policy. One of the standards in the act governing permit cancellations was "the general welfare, health, peace, morals and safety of the
people, and . . . the public sense of decency." The court also seemed concerned by the fact that the statute did not contemplate that the agency
order should be vacated while the proceeding was before the court which is
the statutory basis used by the supreme court to sustain de novo review in
Industrial Accident Board cases. While this basis occasionally is referred to
in other circumstances, it does not form a cornerstone of the doctrine of
complete de novo review in most Texas cases."'
While Texas courts have recognized an increasing number of situations in
which the legislature constitutionally may provide for complete de novo
review of administrative action, this does not cause the courts to construe a
provision for de novo trial upon appeal, couched in general terms, to preclude the necessity of applying the substantial evidence rule. In Firemen's

&¢Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Ham-man9 a policeman, suspended

under civil service rules, contended on appeal that it was necessary for facts
to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The supreme court denied
the contention stating that "a substantial evidence trial is a trial de novo.
... The Legislature did not.., purport to provide for or require a de novo
trial on appeal in the full sense.""9 With Hamman should be compared

HarrisonClinic Hosp. v. Texas State Bd. of Health."° In this case the Board
cancelled a hospital's temporary license. On appeal the hospital argued for

18384 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1964). The case held that revocation of doctor's license by a state
board, under alleged circumstances of drug prescriptions being filled for persons who were habitual
narcotic addicts, was subject to independent judicial review to determine the correctness of the
revocation. The proceeding was not only adjudicatory, but also it did not involve determination
of legislative policy. The statutory criterion applicable to revocation was "grossly unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct of a character which, in the opinion of the Board, is likely to deceive or defraud the public." The court found the substantive standard sufficiently definite (presumably to
sustain fact finding by the court under past precedent) and noted that at an earlier time the court
had been charged with the statutory power to revoke medical licenses. It further found that a policy
discretion was not intended by use of the discretionary words "in the opinion of" since a reasonable
exercise of discretion must be implied. This is in accord with Texas precedent. See, e.g., Nichols
v. City of Dallas, 347 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e. (zoning case). See also
DAvis, ADMINISTRArrvE LAW § 7.02 (1959) for a sound and practical distinction between "quasi
judicial" and "quasi legislative" proceedings to be conducted by administrative tribunals. Davis' adjudicative and legislative fact discussion is also instructive.
1
" Cf., Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex. 1963).
15404 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1966).
9
Id. at 311-12.
20400 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 111 (1966).
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a complete de novo trial under section 9 of article 4437f"1 which provides
that "the proceedings on appeal shall be a trial de novo as such term is
commonly used and intended in an appeal from the Justice Court to a
County Court." The court of civil appeals agreed with the appellant hospital and held that review should have been de novo pursuant to the ruling
in Scott.22 The court stressed the fact that revocation of a license is adjudicatory in nature as it involves primary fact finding related to past licensing
conduct. But the court did not discuss whether the fact that only a temporary license was involved was at all indicative of the presence of legislative policy questions. The Board appealed the court of appeals decision
strongly contending that because it had issued only a temporary certificate
to the hospital and in effect had denied an application for a permanent
license, its action should not be deemed a revocation proceeding (adjudicatory) but a proceeding in which an initial license is being denied (a determination of legislative policy). The Board argued that complete de novo
review was incompatible with the broad public policy scope of the statutory
standards which included the phrase "conduct detrimental to the public
health, morals, welfare and safety of the people of the State of Texas."'
The supreme court recognized that the statute made no provision for
either temporary or permanent certificates, and that, if the Board chose to
call this an initial licensing proceeding, the matter must still be pending as
the record did not show a refusal of an initial application but a Board order
revoking a license. The court alluded to the policy question only briefly,
turning its attention to the actual fact finding nature of the proceedings
before it. The pleadings of the Board had charged that the clinic: had failed
to providelhand-washing facilities for the scrub area of the operating room;
had failed to store oxygen and nitrous oxide separately from other gases;
did not dispose of surgical and contaminated wastes by incineration; and
had maintained an open flame sterilizer in the operating room.
In agreeing that Scott controlled and made complete de novo review constitutionally permissible, the supreme court may have added a degree of
elasticity to the established rules. Emphasis was placed upon the fact finding
nature of the proceeding which "lent itself to decision by the judicial process." 24 In light of the much greater statutory discretion present here than
in Scott, it seems apparent that the court is giving-weight to the fact that
the administrative tribunal had filled in the broad statutory standards to a
considerable extent by definitive rules. It would seem that when the facts in
21 TEx. REV. Cir.

STAT. ANN. art. 4437f, § 9 (1966).
22See note 16 supra.
2 3 Compare Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Longwill, note 11 supra. Complete de novo review of
a liquor permit cancellation was denied, though specifically provided by statute, since the statutory
standards included "the general welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people, and . . .
the public sense of decency."
4
Texas State Bd. of Health v. Harrison Clinic Hosp., 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 111, 113 (1966).
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controversy can be adjudicated in light of the context of the rules, complete
de novo review will lie. This suggested inference might apply to revocations, suspensions and possibly renewals of licenses or certificates. It finds no
support, however, in initial licensing cases because of the prospective nature of the administrative decision involved. A like argument could prevail
in renewal proceedings which also are predominantly prospective. However,
renewal proceedings can involve constitutional rights in property due to investments made upon the strength of a license having been granted, and
this factor could distinguish renewal proceedings from initial licensing proceedings. Projections of conclusions into the future need not be a deterring
factor for complete de novo review if the conclusions must be based upon
ascertainable factual criteria.
Sponsors of revision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
seem to be discarding earlier-held ideas that initial licensing partook more
of the exercise of the legislative than the adjudicatory function.' Perhaps a
more flexible ad hoc determination of when complete trial de novo could
be obtained would be simpler than a generalized test depending on the nature of the function, i.e., whether the agency action is taken under a law
conferring legislative policy discretion on the agency. An agency may not
be required to bring its legislative policies into play in every case. Also, its
rules may have given specific contours to its broad discretions so that it
would not be beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary to redetermine the
agency action as a matter of fact finding. If the exercise of policy discretion had no significant part in the case before the court no constitutional
reason should require denial of complete de novo review.
This suggestion seems to underlie a provision of the 1952 Hobbs Act."'
Section 7b of that act provides that if a hearing was not requited by law
and a genuine issue of material fact is presented, the United States Court of
Appeals on review can transfer the case to the United States District Court
for the district in which the petitioner resides or has his principal office for
hearing and for determination just as though the proceedings were orig-

inally initiated in the district courtv. This by inference is trial de novo. 5
15 Gerst v. Nixon, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 129 (1966).

See definition of "agency license and licensing" as including grants of licenses as well as renewal, revocation, etc., S. REp. No. 1336, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Compare ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 52-53 (1947). See also Fisk, Legislation
and Administrative Law, 17 AD. L. BULL. 115 (1965).' "
s$ U.S.C. §§ 1031-42 (1964). These sections make judicial relief available with respect to
certain final orders of the FCC, the Agriculture Department, the Maritime Commission, the Federal
Maritime Board, and the AEC.
a Carrow, Types of Judicial Relief From Administrative Action, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1958).
See also Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 336 P.2d 884 (Ore. 1959).
Professor Cooper, appraising the reaction of the various states courts to assuming de novo review
of executive action when statutes so provide has said, "[W]here performance of administrative duties
will not interfere with the proper fulfillment of the court's higher responsibilities-and especially
where the assumption of such duties will provide a check against possibilities of abuse of administra-
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B. Delegation Of Powers
City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n," affirmed both lower

courts 3° which had held that the Texas Water Rights Commission had not
delegated its supervisory power illegally under the statutes providing for
Commission approval of permits to withdraw water from the streams of

the state. Both the city of San Antonio and the Guadalupe-Blanco River
Authority applied for permission to withdraw water from the same water-

shed for municipal purposes. After comparative balancing of public interest considerations the city's application was denied. The city complained
that the permit granted the Authority included a grant of all unappropriated water in the shed up to 50,000 acre feet per annum conditioned only
upon (1) use thereof for municipal purposes, and (2) approval by the
Commission of any contracts for such use entered into by the Authority
with any municipality. It was contended that this gave the Authority con-

trol over which cities it would supply and allowed it to deny use of water
to a city which did not write a satisfactory contract. In sustaining the

Commission's position, the court held that the Commission had wide statutory discretion to determine
permits to appropriate water
power, both under its statute
retained in the Commission

whether to grant or deny an application for
to a particular use, that its future supervisory
and under the terms of the permit, adequately
the powers which the legislature intended it

should exercise in behalf of the state. The court noted that the Commission had other statutory powers it could invoke if the water were not sold
at reasonable rates or was disposed of in a discriminatory manner. Further,

the permit issued by the Commission expressly required the Authority to
comply with the laws, rules, regulations and orders of the Commission.
The court observed that the Authority also had statutory obligations and
had acknowledged the Commission's continuing supervisory powers in
its brief.a
tive discretion that otierwise would be remediless-the state courts are not loath to accept responsibilities which are not purely judicial but involve some measure of executive or even legislative
responsibility." CooPER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis expresses the view with the following statement: "The reason for
the holdings that nonjudicial functions may not be reviewed de novo is not that a court is lacking
in qualification to make findings of fact from conflicting evidence but that a court may be lacking
in qualification to take over the discretionary power." DAvis, op. cit. supra note 16, at § 7910.
210 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 66 (1966).
a'392 S.W.2d 200 (1965).
" The breadth of the Commission's statutory discretion may be glimpsed by brief reference to
some of the statute's
provisions. The waters of the statemust be conserved in the public interest
and welfare, and preference in appropriation of water shallbe given to those applications which
effectuate a maximum utilization of water and are so designated as to prevent the escape of water
without contribution to a beneficial service. Trx. REV. CxV. STAT. ANN. art. 7472c (1954). The
statute introduces standards of non-impairment of existing water rights or vested riparian rights
and of non-detriment to the public welfare. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 7507 (1954). The
Board is empowered to reject applications, require their amendment, and approve applications found
in compliance with the act and regulations. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 7492, 7504, 7506,
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C. Notice: ConstitutionalRight To Notice
In City of Houston v. Fore," the city made certain improvements to a
street upon which the defendant's property abutted. The ordinance which
authorized the improvements set a per foot assessment, provided a time and
date for hearing, and provided that notice of the hearing be published in
the Houston Press three times. The defendant did not read the notice and
having no knowledge of the hearing he did not attend. Article 1 105b, section 93 requires notice to abutting property owners specially assessed but
permits the kind of constructive notice given here. The record showed that
the defendant-owner had resided at the property in question for twentyfour years; that his address was on the tax rolls of the city and thus was
known to the city; and that the city had in fact addressed communications
on other matters to the defendant at his address. The court of civil appeals
held the notice by publication insufficient because it was not reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action. Where
the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are
known or easily obtainable, notice by publication is inadequate under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.'
It was contended in a court of civil appeals' that an amendment of the
Austin zoning ordinance was defective on grounds of due process in that
the statutory notice provided for in such proceedings' did not meet constitutional requirements. The particular defect urged was that the statutory
provision only provided for notice to the owners of record in the latest city
tax poll. The complainant failed to render his property, and therefore received no individual- notice, though notice by publication was provided.
The court held that it was reasonable for the legislature to impose upon
property owners the obligation to render to the city value estimates upon
their property, and had the complainant in the present proceeding done
7507 (1954). The Board is authorized to adopt rules and regulations that are reasonable and not
in conflict with the statute. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 7531 (1954). It is given authority
over the charging of reasonable rates. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7653 (1954). Provision
is made for notice and opportunity for public hearing upon an application to appropriate water to
be given any claimant or appropriator of water from the source of water supply. TEx. REV. Civ.
STAr. ANN. art. 7508-09 (1954). The statutory provisions dealing with the subject are numerous,
and these references do not purport to cover all of them. Since the court found the permit reserved
to the Commission power to act on a continuing basis, the court's decision seems correct.
aa 4 0 1 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
33
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1105b, § 9 (1963).
aU.S. CONST. amends. II & IV. This case is in accord with several recent cases handed down
by the Supreme Court of the United States which recognize that when certain property owners to
be assessed are singled out from among property owners generally because city improvements specially improve their property, there is a personal right to be heard. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of
New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (eminent domain).
'Lawton v. City of Austin, 404 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). For further discussion
see, Larsen, Property, this Survey at footnote 32.
NTEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1011d-lif (1963).
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so he would have received individual notice. The court further said that
re-zoning is analogous to the adoption of rules, i.e., an exercise of a legislative function and a statute need not meet tests of constitutional due pro7
cess in legislative type proceedings. The court supported its reasoning by
quoting the following statement from an earlier case: "[I]n Legislation or
rule-making, there is no constitutional right to any hearing whatsoever."37'
This tends, however, to articulate an absolute precept in regard to agency
rule-making that unduly and unnecessarily restricts the scope of judicial
review of administrative action. Under circumstances more serious than
were involved here, this precept could have substantial adverse effect upon
personal and property rights." It is doubtful that in all instances the standards applicable to the legislative process must be equally applicable to rulemaking by the agencies. No comparable inflexible parallels are drawn between administrative adjudications and judicial trials."'
D. Hearing: Constitutional Right Of Hearing
It is probably too early to assess how wide an effect House of Tobacco,
Inc. v. Calvert"' may have. Taking an analytical approach, the court finds
the power of revocation of cigarette distributors' licenses within the purview of the tax statutes rather than the police powers of the state, and therefore, the precedents which have supported more high-handed exercises of
discretion in the police power field do not control. The court then takes a
a Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F,2d 676, 694 (9th Circuit 1949).
" See the discerning article, Fuchs, Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case
With Respect to Procedure and Judicial Review in Administrative Rule-Making, 27 WASH-. U.L.Q.
1 (1941). See also FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265 (1949); The Assigned
Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S.-287
(1920); Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Jordan v. United Ins. Co.
of America, 289 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Glen Oaks Util. Inc. v. City of Houston, 161 Tex.
417, 340 S.W.2d 783 (1960) (rate case involving a number of utility companies); City of Houston
v. Glen Oaks Util., Inc., 360 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e. Coopi7R,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 142, observes that classifying the agency's function as legislative or
judicial does not necessarily determine whether a notice and hearing must be given: "In fact hearings are required in some types where the agency's function is essentially legislative in character, if
the considerations . . . dictate the advisability of insisting on a hearing." The "considerations" he
has reference to, without attempt to detail them all, mainly concern whether the issues before
the court call for striking a balance between public need for expediting the accomplishment of a
public objective, and the countervailing private interest that there be full consideration of the
"rights and privileges" of the affected parties before any official action is taken; further, will the
judicial type of inquiry best reveal the truth, rather than private investigation and inspection by the
administrative tribunal. Professor Cooper concludes that recent cases less frequently use the suggestion of some older cases and texts that whether notice and hearing is required depends on the
determination of the agency's function as legislative or judicial. Earlier Professor Fuchs had said:
"Where economic control of private business enterprise is the purpose of regulation, the practice
of according procedural formalities to affected interests in rule-making as well as in framing orders
of specific application is especially applicable. . . . Procedural formality may be expected to increase
roughly in proportion to the directness with which economic regulation affects the financial condition of the affected business enterprises...." Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52
HAPv. L. REv. 259, 268 (1938).
" Cf., Miller v. County of Los Angeles, 341 F.2d 964 (9th Cir, 1965).
40394 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1965), 19 Sw. L.J. 845.
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next step in the "valuable privilege" direction by comparing a license to
distribute cigarettes to a license to practice dentistry. Hopefully this case
initiates a turn about from the tortured holdings that "useful" occupations
or professions warrant adequate due process procedure but "non-useful"
occupations do not. The need for intensive and reasoned judicial re-examination of the precedents governing due process requirements in licensing
has been'emphasized by others..Perhaps no better reason for reform exists
than economic realism, for regardless of the fact that legislatures may provide in statutes that no property right is conferred by a license, statutes
nonetheless proceed to condition and restrict licensing at length. What in
earlier days might have been simple regulations with needs-of-the-treasury
overtones have now become exhaustive and comprehensive regulations limiting the right to work and to live. Under such conditions the right to due
process should be recognized in simple fairness and justice. 1
II. RULE-MAKING: DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULE-MAKING
AND ADJUDICATION

In Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n' the Texas Railroad Commission, after
holding hearings as required by statute, issued an order prorating the
amount of gas that might be produced in an oil field within two Texas
counties. The court found that the order was supported by competent substantial evidence, and that the trial court committed no error in admitting
on appeal exhibits of technical data obtained after the Commission's order
was issued. The court commented that the data were admitted only to the
extent they revealed conditions actually in existence at the time of the agency order. Further, no error was found in acceptance by the Commission
of particular legislative orders proposed for a resolution of the hearing by
participants interested in the proceeding. The court defined the character of
the Commission's actions as legislative; found that the Commission's acceptance was similar to action which takes place in the legislature itself;
and concluded there was no evidence of Commission abdication of duty
or delegation of power to private persons. Hence, the exercise of functions
in a manner that would give rise to due process questions in an adjudicatory
proceeding-basing a decision on matters not of record--does not give rise
to such questions in rule-making.
It was contended that the admission of recent evidence in the trial court
was violative of the rule that the agency order be tested by conditions existing when the agency acted. This contention was rejected by the supreme
court because the recent evidence was admitted upon a limited fact basis
consistent with according full recognition to the expert status of the Coin41 Compare COOPER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 140-42.

42387 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

mission. Realistically such an issue has only occasional impact in light of
* (1) the usual omission of basic findings from Railroad Commission orders
(which if included, presumably would point to the kinds of evidence which
the Commission deemed material in the administrative proceeding), and
(2) the freedom to introduce a complete de novo case in the district court
upon appeal, which was exercised in this case. The court noted that "the
record made before the Commission is not before us, and no attempt was
3
made to introduce it into evidence.''
III. ADJUDICATION

A. Requirements As To Notice
Right To Be Advised of Nature of Claim. In a court of civil appeals
case"4 the plaintiff complained that he was not given adequate notice under
the statutes. It was held that the same rule will be followed as in civil trials.
Since a party's appearance in a civil action amounts to a waiver of service or
of any irregularity therein, the same rule applies to one appearing at a hearing before an administrative body such as a board of adjustment for a municipality, or to one who did not receive the statutory notice provided in
the Air Pollution Board's statutes but attended a meeting of the Board and
was allowed to present testimony in opposition to the order granting a permit.'

Form and Content of Notice. In Firemen's &4Policemen's Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Hamman,' the Texas statute"7 involved was specific in its requirements for the service of charges upon policemen in disciplinary proceedings and 4stluded a prohibition against introducing evidence under
charges arising from events that occurred more than six months before the
charges were filed. The statement of charges was not subject to amendment. A second statement of charges filed against a police officer depended
upon proof of events occurring within the six-month period preceding the
first charge. The supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals decision
which had invalidated this procedure as lending itself to a circumvention
of the statute. The high court read the statute according to its terms as not
having application to a second, separate complaint. The decision seems
overly technical. The supreme court no doubt recognized the problems of
cities in administering efficient police forces and considered this an important area for administrative latitude, as it no doubt is. But the apparent
43 Id. at 45.
4 5 White v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 363 S.W.2d 955

(Tex. Civ. App. "1963) error ref. n.r.e.
" City of San Antonio v. C.D.J. Enterprises, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e. See also, Trimble v. Texas State Bd. of Registration for Professional Eng'rs, 387
S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1965).
46404 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1966).
4'Tx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (1963).
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policy of proceeding with fairness and with due deliberation embodied by
this statute is equally deserving of appreciation.

B. Hearing Stage
Combination of Functions. Hamiman summarily disposed of a contention
that a member of the Civil Service Commission is disqualified from participating in the decision of a case because he has previously performed investigatory functions in the case. This view is novel neither in Texas nor
elsewhere; but the court added the frequent and important caveat: "We do
not hold that under no facts or circumstances would a combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions constitute a denial of due process of
law."'

Right To Cross-Examine. In Warren Independent School Dist. v. South-

ern Neches Corp."9 the supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, stated that
the court of civil appeals ° was incorrect, though not reversibly so, in finding that action by the Board of Equalization refusing land owners the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at its hearing was a denial of due process. The Board accorded the owners opportunity to be heard orally on their
timberland values and heard evidence of values of minerals which the timber owners contended were not bearing their proportionate share of the
tax burdens. The owners, said the court, did not have the further right to
cross-examine witnesses at an earlier hearing of the Board held to determine mineral values. The Board had a right so to control its process as to
hear evidence on mineral values at one hearing, and evidence on timberland
values at a later hearing.
What Evidence May Be Received. Under an unusual provision of the
statute establishing an Air Control Board of the State of Texas, the Board
must apply the rules of evidence in hearings held upon complaint as are
-applied in the district courts."1 Most agencies are not bound by the technical
rules of evidence."3

C. Post-HearingStage
Form of Decisions and Orders. Findings of basic (non-jurisdictional)
fact are not required to be expressed in an administrative order, unless the
statute provides otherwise. This rule was adhered to in a recent civil appeals
case. The statute involved did not require that the Railroad Commission
4

sFiremen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Hamman, 404 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. 1966).
S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1966).
°405 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
"1TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-4, § 8 (1966).
" Harris, The Administrative Law of Texas, 29 TEXAs L. REV. 213, 221 (1950). The Railroad
Commission, with the cooperation of the Bar, in 1966 promulgated rules of procedure for the
transportation division, rule 34 of which deals with admissibility of evidence and isessentially
similar and equally progressive to the statutory requirement in note $1 supra.
"'Railroad Comm'n v. Brown Express, Inc., 399 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
49404

granted.
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make basic findings of fact supporting the action it took in approving or
disapproving the transfer of a motor carrier certificate. However, the statute" contained a provision imposing a duty to present any proposed transfer of a certificate to the Commission for approval or disapproval, and
empowered the Commission to disapprove the transfer "if it be found and
determined" that one of several stated grounds existed-so-called ultimate
or conclusionary findings-including the ground that the transfer proposed
"is not best for the public interest." The statute also provided that the
Commission might take into consideration all requirements and qualifications which applied to "a regular applicant." The Commission approved
the transfer and made four conclusionary findings that could be closely
identified with the several statutory grounds, with one exception: there was
no mention of the "public interest."
The court of civil appeals, carefully following the reasoning of Tarry
Moving el Storage Co. v. Railroad Covimn'n which had dealt with similar
issues in a specialized motor carrier case, held that: (1) the statutory requirement of taking into consideration the "public interest" in a certificate
transfer application did not import all of the public interest, convenience
and necessity considerations applicable to an initial carrier certification; and
(2) failure to make a finding that the "public interest" was served in approving the transfer did not make the order defective since the finding of
public convenience and necessity in the initial certification could be incorporated by implication and considered with the four specific findings
contained in the order as reasonably amounting to a "public interest" finding. The court of civil appeals seems by analogy in accord with the 1963
-supreme court decision; but the decision is questionable because it relies on
findings made when the carrier was originally certified. This appears to be
unsound statutory construction when applied to a present evaluation of the
public interest."
5
-'Ex.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 911b (1964).
367 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1963).
s Railroad Comm'n v. Walker Transfer & Storage Co., 405 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
was an action to review a Railroad Commission order granting a specialized motor carrier certificate.
The sufficiency of the order was challenged. The statement of facts in the order was as follows:
"Because of the seasonal nature . . . of this commodity numerous transportation facilities are
necessary . . . and in almost every . . . season certified carriers are required to lease equipment ...
For these reasons, the Commission finds the public convenience and necessity requires the granting
of this application." The Motor Carrier Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 911b, 5 5a(d)
(1964), requires that the order set forth "full and complete findings of fact pointing out in detail
the inadequacies of the services . . . existing ....
" The court affirmed the trial court judgment
declaring the order invalid and held that the two broad generalizations stated in the order were
not of a nature specific enough so that a court, upon reading them, can fairly and reasonably
say that they either do or do not support the required ultimate statutory findings of inadequacy
of services.
The case is in accord with recent decisions in Texas construing statutes requiring detailed findings
of fact. The number of statutory provisions of this kind, however, is inconsiderable as yet. In the
case of agency orders issued under other statutes, the practice is to accept ultimate findings of the
agency, and to indulge the presumption that there are basic reasons adequate to the occasion.
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Res Judicata. The supreme court held in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Rampy st that a denial by the Industrial Accident Board of compensation
for disability allegedly occasioned by several heat strokes in 1962 could
properly form the basis for refusing a claim presented in 1963. The Supreme Court said that the trial court should have sustained the Board's plea
of res judicata, since this doctrine applies to matters passed on or which
might have been litigated in the first action between the same parties. The
Board's first order had been appealed to and sustained by the district court.
IV.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Constitutional Right Of Review
The traditional view of Texas courts that there is a right to judicial
review of acts of legislative and administrative bodies affecting constitutional or property rights was again stated in City of Houston v. Blackbird."

B. Method Of Review: Statutory Appeals
Scott v. Board of Adjustments' placed Texas in accord with a number of
other state jurisdictions" by holding that a taxpayer can appeal the decision
of a zoning board of adjustment where a statute"' gives such a right. It is
not necessary for the taxpayer to make a showing of special or particular
damage as a result of the board's action. The case, which was reversed and
remanded for trial on the merits, involved a grant of a variance from the
requirements of the zoning ordinance of the city of Corpus Christi to'
permit the operator of a Ramada Inn to maintain a sign substantially larger
than the size allowed by the ordinance for signs of this type. Three taxpayers sought an injunction against the city-one owned property within the
zoned district but made no showing of special damage, and the other two
taxpayers owned residences several miles away. The common contention
made was that the bay front would be damaged scenically.
The court overruled the holding of the court of civil appeals that no
justiciable interest provoking a case or controversy was presented by the
taxpayers. The court stated that the legislature has the power within limits
to authorize the taxpayers to sue in behalf of the public at large. Apart
" 392 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1965).
5'394 S.W.2d

159 (Tex. 1965).

See also Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Title Ins. Ass'n, 272

S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1954) (judicial review accorded to an order of the Board of Insurance Commissioners approving an agency contract between a title insurance company and an abstract company, though no statutory provision for review existed).
" 405 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1966).
'0 For a discussion of the extent to which state courts have allowed standing, without regard to
statute, to citizens and taxpayers and others alleging adverse impact of governmental action, see
DAVis. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 22.09, 22.10, 22.11, 22.18 (1958); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
opi ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION chs. 12, 13 (1965); 2 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 16
(1965).
'"Tux. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011g (1963).
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from statutes expressly giving standing, Texas has permitted taxpayers'
suits in the past in relation to misuse of public funds and expenditure of
tax monies. 2 Neither criteria was involved in the present case. Professor
Cooper, in his recent work, State Administrative Law, after noting the
broader recognition of taxpayers' standing to sue elsewhere, adds: "However, notwithstanding the general liberality in recognizing the standing of
taxpayers to challenge the validity of administrative action, still if the court
feels that a particular action smacks of officious intermeddling by an individual who is in no genuine sense aggrieved, and who expresses concern
as a taxpayer merely to gain a forum to debate a political question, he may
be denied standing. '
Standing to sue and right to statutory appeal were also involved in City
of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n " where the Guadalupe Authority
contended that the city of San Antonio had no standing to appeal an order
of the Water Commission granting a permit to the Authority. The supreme
court overruled the contention on the basis of a statutory provision " which
gave the right to "any person affected by any . . . order . . . of the Board"
to petition for review to set aside, modify or suspend the order. The court
held that the city and the Authority had presented conflicting applications
for the same purpose-water appropriation. Their applications were consolidated for public hearing because the same considerations largely applied
to each and a statutory balancing of benefits and detriments in approving
one application and denying the other resulted in a determination of the
same issues. These factors, the court concluded, constituted the city a person affected by the administrative tribunal's order within the statutory
contemplation. of judicial review and hence a "party aggrieved" by the district court's judgment upholding the order. This afforded the city the statutory right of appeal to the court of civil appeals and of review by appeal
or writ of error to the supreme court.
C. Timing Application To Court
Exhausting Administrative Remedies. In House of Tobacco, Inc. v. Calvert" the state contended that the petitioner should have exhausted his administrative remedies by requesting the state comptroller to give him a
hearing before applying for a temporary injunction against cancellation of
his cigarette permit. This contention was rejected by the supreme court because there was no provision for hearing in the statute or in the rules of
the comptroller. The statute was held constitutional, even though it failed
to provide for a hearing, because the court assumed that the legislature in62

Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 205, 281 S.W. 837 (1926).
" CooPER, op. cit. supra note 60, at 557.

e' 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 66 (1966).
5
e TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7477, §
394 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1965).

12, 14 (1954).
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tended to enact a valid law and further intended that the administrative
board would proceed in accordance with constitutional requirements. This
position was consistent with distinctions the supreme court has drawn in
the past. "7 The result was that the supreme court issued a temporary injunction because no notice had been given and no hearing was held by the
comptroller; thus, cantellation of the permit was prevented. The supreme
court refused to allow'the interpretation of the trial court that a judicial
hearing upon a petition for an injunction may substitute for an administrative hearing antecedent to permit cancellation.
Finality of Administrative Order. A court of civil appeals"8 was faced
with the issue of whether a transfer of a motor carrier certificate was properly handled by the Railroad Commission. The protestants had previously
complained to the Commission that the certificate should be revoked, and
the Commission had overruled their complaint without affording a hearing.
The court first said that under the applicable statutes the revocation power
was a matter for discretionary exercise by the Commission. However, the
court then seemingly went further. It referred to the rules of the Commission which 9reserve "sole discretion" to determine whether a complaint is
"sufficient."" It then said: "Additionally, even if the Commission had
called the hearing and had found that there was a partial or total discontinuance of operations, appellees would not thereby have acquired any kind
of right to require the Commission to revoke the certificates, and the Commission would have breached' no duty had it failed to do so."'
If the court is merely elaborating the view that revocation need not
follow automatically upon filing of a complaint or even upon proving up a
complaint, this may well be so, since the Commission is the expert body
given discretion to determine the circumstances under which revocation
shall be ordered. But the language employed by the court is broad and may
be construed as ruling that the Commission's action in this regard is administratively final; that its discretion is absolute because of the permissive
"may" contained in the statute. The court may not have intended to assume
so strong a position. But it would appear that once the Commission adopts
rules providing for receipt of complaints and procedures with respect thereto, even if discretion is retained, judicial review should lie upon a sufficient
showing of abuse of this discretion.7'
7 Industrial Ace. Bd. v. O'Dowd, 303 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1957). So long as the statute
does
not prohibit notice and hearing and notice and hearing are given, a due process question does not

arise.
69 Railroad Comm'n v. Brown Express Inc., 399 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App, 1966) error
granted.
69 Id. at 877.
7'Id. at 878.
71See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939)
(negative character of an
order does not prevent it from being a final reviewable order); see also Mutual Aid v. Williams,
407 S.W:2d 171 (Tenn. 1966).
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Affirming a court of civil appeals7 decision, the supreme court recently
held in Employers Re-Insurance Corp. v. Holt73 that a letter written by the
Industrial Accident Board declining to take jurisdiction of a workmen's
compensation claim was a final order and appealable. The court made it
clear that whether the administrative action is ripe for review depends on
whether the Board, by its action, reserves something for future decision,
thus making its order preliminary and not final. Two court of civil appeals
cases were expressly disapproved. The Board's decision is final for purposes
of appeal when the Board has finally acted, either by declining to take
jurisdiction or by action on the merits of the claim." The court's opinion
ended with the admonition: "The finality of Board orders would be clearer
and more manifest in such cases as this one if the orders would state: 'The
claim is not compensable within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and is denied.'
D. The Record On Review
In accordance with Texas precedent which has applied the "substantial
evidence rule," 7 a court of civil appeals case' recently held that it was not
error for the court, while hearing an appeal from a denial of a license, to
refuse to consider an administrative hearing transcript, since the transcript
contained matter not admissible under the rules of evidence. However, the
supreme court held that this precedent is not a barrier where there is a statutory provisio for judicial review, in this case the hew Savings and Loan
Act, based solely upon the record made before the agency and which requires that the record be certified to the court."" The supreme court (1)
declared de novo review. compulsions of the new statute unconstitutional,
(2) found them severable from other judicial review provisions, and (3)
interpreted the language ". . . but no evidence shall be admissible Which was
not adduced at the hearing on the matter before the Commissioner or
officially noticed in the record of such hearing. . . ." as requiring a somewhat novel application of the substantial evidence test in Texas-substantial evidence represented by the record made before the administrative
body and not the court.
E. Taking Additional Evidence
The rule of "administrative finality" was applied by the court of civil
72393 S.W.2d 329

(1966).

3

"4 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (1966).

7 Hart v. TEIA, 387 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.; Thompson v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 361 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
75Accord, COOPER, Op. cit. supra note 60, at 589-93.
76Note 73 supra, at 142.
77See note 4 supra.
7sRichardson v. Thompson, 390 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. i.r.e.
T
Gerst v. Nixon, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 129 (1966).
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appeals in Dieter v. Houston Fire d Cas. Ins. Co." In this workmen's compensation case the company sought to offer testimony on appeal that the
claimant had undergone surgery after the industrial accident award was
made, aid that the probable efre,.t thereof required a modi fication of the
administrative finding of total disability. The trial court permitted the
testimony, and was reversed on appeal, since the insurer had not presented
to the Board at the time of hearing a demand that a surgical operation be
performed in order to effect a cure or materially and beneficially improve
claimant's condition, as the statute provided." The case which seemed strict
-considerations of administrative finality which would prevent the introduction in evidence of supervening facts on occasion have yielded to the
court's view that material facts which are newly discovered be considered
either by the reviewing court or by the agency if the court has the power
to remand-predictably was overruled by the supreme court.8
F. Scope Of Review
Excess of Statutory Authority. The state sued a delivery service for penalties and to secure an injunction against the company's further operation
of a motor carrier without a certificate. The defense was that the Texas
Railroad Commission had no jurisdiction over motor carriers which operated
exclusively within the incorporated limits of cities or towns due to a statutory exemption.83 The defendant operated solely within a number of contiguous incorporated cities. In State i'. Ace Delivery Serv., Inc." the supreme court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and held that
the Railroad Commission had jurisdiction. The court said that a liberal construction must be given the statute in order that the intention of the legislature to provide for more stringent regulation of the motor carrier industry might be carried out. The court added that it anticipated no difficulties arising between city control of streets and the Railroad Commission
regulation of the carriers. In effect, the court has construed legislative language in the context of a presumed legislative intent, reaching a desirable
result on a subject of growing state and local concern.
In Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy,"' the Pharmacy Board, after
notice and hearing, found a registered pharmacist guilty of substituting a
drug other than the drug prescribed without the consent of the prescriber
88403 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deiter, 409
S.W.2d 838 (1966). For further discussion see Akin, Worknen's *Coinpensation, this Survey at
footnote 36.
81TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (1967).
82409 S.W.2d at 838. See also Enterprise Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (death of
a substantial figure in an applicant corporation after the agency's final decision caused remand for
further agency determination of the applicant's comparative qualifications).
83TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 911b, § 1(g) (1964).
4388 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. 1965).
8 382 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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in violation of statute." The pharmacist had no knowledge of the substitution and was not negligent. His pharmacist's license was suspended for three

years, all but sixty days of this period being made a probationary. period,
On appeal, the substantial evidenie rule was applied ahd the Board was :
enjoined from carrying out its suspension order for lack of evidence of
scienter.' 7
The supreme court held that when the legislature banned the "substitution" of a drug it meant to restrict this "substitution" to "conscious substitution." The court distinguished certain federal and state cases involving
misrepresentation, negligence, foodstuffs or stronger legislative public safety
considerations. Three justices dissented, expressing the view that judicial
legislation had been written by the majority opinion, and that the pharmacist is in better position to know the content of mislabeled drug containers
than the consumer."

In State v. Harrington," the state instituted a civil suit for penalties
charging that the defendants had drilled deviated wells in violation of laws
and rules administered by the Railroad Commission. The supreme court
held that the state need not show, as a condition to recovery of the penalties,

"knowledge" or "intent" on the part of the defendants since the statute
in question" had previously contained a provision for wilful or knowing
violation of its terms, and this restrictive language had been eliminated
in 1935. On this ground of demonstrated legislative intent not to require
the state to show scienter, the court distinguished Bloom.
In a recent civil appeals case,' 1 the plaintiffs, operators and owners of
Texas State Optical, Lee Optical and other firms, challenged the power of
the Board of Examiners in Optometry to adopt a rule particularly forbidding the use of an assumed name in the practice of optometry. The trial
court found that the Board did havE the power to make the rule. The court
of civil appeals reversed, reasoning that the failure of the legislature to include use of assumed names in the statute!" setting out grounds for revoca58

TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4542, § 12(h) (1960).
" 382 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
s The Federal Administrative Procedure Act defines a "sanction" to include either a penalty or
fine or a suspension.

5 U.S.C.

S

1001

(1964).

In

the present

case a suspension was

involved.

In the recent case of FTC v. Henry Brock & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962), the United States Supreme
Court intimated strongly that it would require the Federal Trade Commission to draft its cease
and desist orders with more definiteness when the penalty for violation became more harsh under
an amendment to the statute. There is perhaps no more than variation in degree between the approach taken by the Supreme Court of the United States and the interpretation of the Texas
Supreme Court in Bloom, when we realize that a penalty in the form of a fine, no matter how
drastic its terms, may affect the party less than a lengthy suspension of license to pursue the livelihood toward which years of education and training have been given.
'9407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966).
"TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6036 (1962).
"' Carp v. Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 401 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)

error granted.
" TEx. REV. Csv. STAT. ANN.

art. 4563

(1960).
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tion of a license, in effect, expressed a legislative intention to exclude such
action as a ground for revocation under the canon expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Legislative intention to withhold power to prohibit assumed names was shown by the fact that in 19 53 the legislature rejected by
decisive votes in both Houses an amendment Which would have limited the
practice of optometry under an assumed name. In the light of this legislative intent, the court found that the Board did not have the power to make
the challenged rule. The court distinguished Kee v. Baber," on the ground
that optometry rules there sustained implemented but did not add to the
statute. In Baber, however, the supreme court found the rulemaking power
conferred on the Board to be very broad since the optometry rulemaking
power expressly extends to rules necessary for "the regulation of the practice of optometry.""4 Since the same statute was before the supreme court
in Baber and the court of civil appeals in this case, it is difficult to reconcile
the supreme court's view that the Optometry Board had a broad power to
make rules with the court of civil appeals' application of expressio unius
in the present case. The Baber case seems distinguishable since the rules involved in that proceeding, e.g., the "bait advertising" rules, were more
reasonably related to the Board's express statutory jurisdiction over acts of
deceit or misrepresentation and were regulatory rather than prohibitory (as
in the case with the assumed name rule). Moreover, in the present case
there is evidence of legislative intent to withhold the asserted power. However, it may be that the second ground assigned by the court of civil appeals in support of its conclusion, that there was a demonstrated rejection
of a grant of power to the Board to regulate in the area of assumed names,
may serve to distinguish the cases. Legislative history of this kind, however
logical the above construction may seem, often becomes the subject of conflicting inferences. For example, courts may reason that the amendment
rejected was administratively desirable only for clarification of existing
statutory authority, or that it was rejected because the existing authority
comprehended the subject, or that administrative practice over an adequate period of time had involved exercise of the power, and this practice
was known to and acquiesced in by the legislature. The case does not indicate the presence of such possibilities. Since this article was prepared the
supreme court has reversed the court of appeals." As the reversal does not
affect the administrative law point involved, namely that the court independently reviews the question of statutory interpretation involved in a
regulation adopted by an administrative agency, the supreme court decision will not be discussed.
93 303 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. 1957)
other rules).

(upholding Board's rule regulating "bait advertising," and two

9'TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4556

"Texas

(1960).

State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 194 (1967).
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Abuse of Discretion.In City of Houston v. Blackbird" the supreme court
found that the judicial review provisions of the Street Improvement Statute" does not permit de novo judicial review of special paving assessments
made by cities against properties abutting the improvements. Review therefore was limited to arbitrary action or fraud on the part of the assessing
body."8 The court found that the city's determination of the benefits accruing to the plaintiff's property because of the proposed improvements
was an arbitrary determination and thus an abuse of discretion.

Unsupported by Substantial Evidence. A 'common question faced by
Texas courts reviewing action taken by administrative agencies under statute is how far they can extend their powers of judicial review without
violating the separation of powers provision."' But the question of how
limited judicial review of administrative action is intended to be is an infrequent one. The new Savings and Loan Act ° presented the problem di-

rectly in Gerst v. Nixon.' Although the new judicial review provisions
inserted in the Statute in 1963 provided in a general way for trial de novo
and a redetermination of fact issues "on the preponderance of the compe-

tent evidence," they also provided that "no evidence shall be admissible
which has not adduced at the hearing on the matter before the Commis-

sioner or officially noticed in the record."' °"s The court held that the legislature had the prerogative to specify the kind and nature of review "so
long as constitutional safeguards and requirements are not transgressed."' '
" 394 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1965). For further discussion see Webster and FitzGerald, Municipal
Corporations, this Survey at footnote 65.
97
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. l1i05b, S 9 (1963).
s The issue was whether or not trial de novo was proper. The statute, note 97 supra, contained
the customary provision that the governing body of the city shall assess abutting owners only after
a hearing. Owners are entitled to challenge the amounts of the proposed assessments and the special
benefits to the abutting owners; and it was further provided that the governing body should "determine the amounts of assessments and all other matters necessary at the hearing." (Emphasis
supplied.) The same statutory provision contained judicial review provisions, less specifically describing de novo trial characteristics than many Texas statutes do, yet providing for "institution
of a suit." It provided that a challenge of the amount of assessment could be contested on appeal
and that contest could be had with respect to "any matter or thing not in the discretion of the
governing body." (Emphasis supplied.) The legislature must have intended, according to the supreme
court, that a finding of special benefit to abutting property and a determination of the amount
thereof should be entrusted to the governing body of a city, for otherwise these matters would
have been made expressly subject to contest on appeal, and would not have been precluded from
review as matters within the "discretion" of the city and subject to its "determination." Trial
de novo on these matters was therefore held improper as a matter of statutory construction. The
question to be decided on review, then, is limited to whether the evidence in the record establishes
that the action of the city in making the benefits determination was arbitrary.
"gProfessor Davis has entitled the subject "The Constitutional Maximum of Review," DAvis,
op. cit, supra note 60, § 29.10.
'"°TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 852a (1964).
10110 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 129 (1966), affirming 399 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
'" TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 852a, S 11.12(5) (b) (1964).
'03 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 132.
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Thus, if the legislative branch guards against arbitrary administrative
action in its provisions for judicial review, it may do so in language restricting the court to a review of the administrative record though that
record may include incompetent matter. The presence in the record of incompetent material "is a matter for the consideration of the trial judge in
determining the issue of 'substantial evidence'."" ° The court supported its
conclusions by especially noting the directives in the statute for the formulation of a formal record, and the filing of the record with the court on
review. The supreme court also (1) voided the de novo review provisions
as unconstitutional in view of the broad administrative standards represented in the statutory terms "public need" and "undue harm to existing
associations,
(2) approved the definition of "public need" given in a
recent court of appeals decision;"' (3) construed the statute to require application of the substantial evidence rule and defined substantial evidence
as such evidence as would justify administrative action as not being "arbitrary"; 7 and (4) affirmed the judgments of the courts below finding the
Commissioner's order not supported by substantial evidence.
In a court of civil appeals case' °1 the State Water Pollution Control Board
granted a permit to a public district to discharge sewage effluent from a
sewage treatment plant into a usually dry stream in the vicinity of the
plaintiff's property. The plaintiff appealed under the statute"' which provides in clear and specific terms for complete de novo review, i.e., the preponderance of the evidence and not the substantial evidence rule was to
be applied. It was held nonetheless that review should be under the substantial evidence rule because the license granting powers of the administrative tribunal were involved, and therefore the action was legislative in
nature."' It may be added that the various duties and standards in the statute were somewhat broad.' including the following statutory language:
"This shall not be construed to prohibit the Board from taking any means
4

1 Id. at 133.
"0sId. at 130.
"In
Chimney Rock Nat'l Bank v. State Banking Bd., 376 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
a definition of the term "public necessity" under the Texas banking statute, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 342-30 (1959), was given for the first time. The court of civil appeals said that "public
necessity" does not mean an "absolute need" or "economic need," or tlat existing banks are not
meeting the present banking necessities, on the one hand, or "mere inconvenience" on the other;
but convenience supplemented by circumstances persuasive of necessity such as rapid population
growth and substantial growth of all banks in the area may be sufficient.
"o10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 132.
"' Corder v. State Water Pollution Control Bd., 391 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error
ref. n.r.e.
"'0TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 7621d, § 4 (Supp. 1966).
1"°Kost v. Texas Real Estate Comm'n, 359 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref.
(denied de novo judicial review of the issuance of a real estate salesman's license under a statute
calling for broad exercise of discretion under rules to be promulgated by the Commission).
..
" See, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7621d, §§ 1, 4 (Supp. 1966).
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by this Act to prevent the discharge of waste which is injurious to public
health."..
The court of civil appeals applied the substantial evidence rule and reversed the administrative tribunal in a case requiring no greater expertness on the part of the state board than on the part of the reviewing court.
A liquor permit was administratively suspended because beer had been
sold to a minor, and appeal followed. The issue was whether it had been
sold "knowingly," a condition to suspension expressed in the statute. The
facts showed that the proprietor of the liquor store knew that an investigator for the Liquor Control Board was seated in a car across the street at
the time of the sale, and that the store had suffered a three-day suspension
several months before. Under these circumstances the court reversed the
Board on the basis that "reasonable minds" could not believe that the proprietor had "knowingly" sold beer to a minor."'
In another court of civil appeals case"" the State Banking Board granted
an application for a bank charter. After surveying the evidence introduced
in the district court in a non-jury trial, the court of civil appeals applied
the substantial evidence rule, saying: "It is our opinion that under this
record the Board could not have entered an order that would have been
an abuse of its discretion. There is an abundance of evidence of a substantial nature which would have reasonably supported an order denying a
charter to Northline as well as reasonably supporting the order entered.
It is in such situations that the expertise of the Board is employed with
conclusive effect.""'
The prima facie weight attaching to orders of administrative agencies
subject to the substantial evidence rule was re-emphasized in City of San
Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n." The court reiterated a test it has ap-

plied before, i.e., that those Who appeal an agency order, reviewable under
the substantial evidence formula, have the burden of showing "that the
order denying their application is not reasonably supported by substantial
evidence
existing at the time of the entry of the order by the Commis7
sion.pi1

12Id.
§ 5(h). Compare State Bd. of Ins. v. Professional & Business Men's Ins. Co., 359 S.W.2d
3 12 (Tex. Civ. App. -1962) error ref. n.r.e. (under a less discretionary statute, more susceptible
to objective fact finding, initial licensing administrative action was held subject to de novo court
review).
" Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Coggins, 402 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
""State Banking Bd. & Northline State Bank v. Airline Nat'l Bank, 398 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1966) error ref. o.r.e.
115ld. at 815.
"0 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 66 (1966).
' Id. at 71.

